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31 January 1947

**MEMORANDUM**

Subject: Attached memorandum entitled "Program for ORE", dated 13 January 1947

1. Paragraphs 2 through 9 and paragraph 14 of the subject memorandum are premised upon misconceptions expressed in paragraph 1. A critical examination of that paragraph will therefore dispose of more than half of the text under consideration.

2. The tone of this first paragraph (and of paragraphs 2 and 6) implies that the survey conducted by OGD discovered serious deficiencies in the C.I.G. Daily Summary. This interpretation cannot be reconciled with a candid reading of the OGD report, particularly with the expressions of satisfaction and appreciation attributed therein to the President, Admiral Leahy, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, General Eisenhower, and Admiral Nimitz. Actually the sum of the findings of the survey has been construed to be favorable.

3. Insofar as the first paragraph depends upon a quotation from Captain Grantham, it is based upon a quotation out of context with consequent distortion.

Captain Grantham's critical comment came to the attention of ORE prior to the completion of the final OGD report. The implications of the comment were not clear and ORE immediately requested OGD to endeavor to procure from him amplification and elucidation, to enable it to correct any erratic practice which might have intruded. In his subsequent explanation, Captain Grantham modified his critical statement and nullified its direct implications. Captain Grantham said that he "likes the summaries just as they are now prepared", and that the President and Admiral Leahy find them "entirely satisfactory." For reasons not indicated, this conclusive statement is not expressed in the reference memorandum.

4. Captain Grantham himself explained that his comment was not based on any change in the substantive content of the Summary, but only on its dissemination. But as there has been no change in dissemination, the point originally made by him was not well taken.

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The Summary has always been designed primarily for the President, further dissemination being intended to inform others as to the information furnished him. It appears that Captain Grantham made an offhand comment, which he himself realized, on second thought, that he was unable to sustain. It is fair, in consequence, to conclude that no "pique" was occasioned or expressed.

5. The constructive suggestions elicited by the OGD Survey (items 1,2,4,5,7,8, and 13 of the "Synopsis") have already been adopted so far as practicable. This point can be sustained in detail if need be.

6. Paragraphs 3-6 of the draft memorandum concern a proposal that certain members of ORE (presumably additional to the present Current Division) be designated to specialize in the production of current intelligence with a view to meeting the "complaints" recorded in the OGD survey. Inasmuch as the survey was commendatory rather than complaining, and inasmuch as its constructive suggestions have already been put into effect to the extent practicable in any case, the supposed need for radical innovation does not exist. We have, of course, already discussed among ourselves the idea of the specialization of additional personnel in current intelligence. Such specialization, without close coordination with the Branches, would tend to impair the quality of the summaries. In effect, published items and commentary are prepared by competent officers in ORE.

7. Paragraphs 7-9 relate to the idea of several daily summaries on different levels, an idea which appears to be derived essentially from Captain Grantham's mistaken effort to distinguish between an original and a subsequent orientation of the Daily toward different levels.

8. There has been, in the past, some discussion of a special summary for the President and the members of the N.I.A. only. This idea was originally put forward on the ground that certain material now denied us might be made available for a summary of such limited dissemination. We cannot know, of course, what the nature and volume of that material might be, whether it would in fact be made available to us, and whether a summary prepared by us would be the most efficient means of circulating it among so small a group. In any case, it was then agreed that no basis of distinction existed with respect

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to the information currently available and that the more exclusive summary would not be undertaken until access to appropriate information had been assured. As for a summary for the President alone, we are unable to distinguish between his interests and the collective interests of the Secretaries of State, War and the Navy.

9. It is considered impracticable that a summary be prepared, outside of his own office, for the use of the President, or any other particular recipient, which is not susceptible to marks of emphasis or deletion by the personal staff which such officials retain for precisely such purposes. OIG accomplishes its function in narrowing the field to a selected group of items all of which are of potential special interest and which, in the opinion of ORE, are of sufficient consequence to be brought to attention.

10. Paragraph 10 of the draft memorandum proposes a radical change in the character of the Weekly. The proposal is to convert the Weekly into a synopsis of current events, primarily for the presumed benefit of G-2, A-2, and O.N.I. The implicit suggestion that these agencies would obtain, through such a Weekly, all or most of what they need or desire to know of current political and economic intelligence, is mistaken. The service, if any, would be in relieving them of the necessity to publish weeklies of their own for their own purposes. This presupposes a circulation in the hundreds of copies, with all that that implies in relation to content.

The Weekly was originally established to accomplish what is impracticable in the Daily Summary as the latter is constituted - the presentation of the most significant current developments in perspective and with consideration of probable consequences. As such it is an essential complement of the Daily (please see, for example, items 2-5 of the OGB synopsis), and is designed primarily to serve the President and the N.I.A. in compliance with the terms of N.I.A. Directive No. 1.

In effect the Weekly answers also a desire and need for area and functional analyses of political, military and economic developments and trends, which it is sometimes proposed should be treated only at periodic intervals, as in monthly publications. ORE believes it advisable that current issues and significant conditions be presented and analyzed at the earliest practicable opportunity and utilizes its

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Weekly for such purposes. At the end of a given period, it is found that the estimates contained in the Weekly give, in the aggregate, admirable understandings of all areas which, during such period, may have been deserving of attention. (See 13, following.)

11. The present Weekly is a higher order of endeavor than that proposed. Synoptical weeklies of the type proposed are commonplace, precisely because they are a less demanding task; the selective and analytical approach of the C.I.G. Weekly is unique.

ORE is of the opinion that the President and the N.I.A. are better served by a selective and analytical weekly than by a synoptical one. The OGD survey indicates general approval of the present form.

12. An alternative to the abolition of the present Weekly in favor of that proposed would be, of course, the publication of both types.

If the proposed Weekly were undertaken, it is not believed that it would actually relieve G-2, A-2, and O.N.I. of the necessity to produce publications oriented toward the particular needs of the several services, nor would they actually abolish their own corresponding publications. Those publications would simply be duplicated by yet another of the same type but so general in character as not to be fully satisfactory to anyone.

13. Paragraphs 11 and 12 of the draft memorandum propose a series of monthly situation reports, yet another form of current reporting. Such overemphasis upon routine, periodic reports must inevitably divert the attention and aims of ORE from the analysis of fundamental problems, as exemplified in ORE 1, or of emergent critical situations as they develop or are foreshadowed. The already projected program for the ORE series contemplates the preparation of a general coverage of fundamental studies, as a basis for the initial determination of requirements and as a plane of reference for subsequent analyses of emergent situations. Such subsequent reports, however, should be produced as indicated by the developing situation rather than on a routine, periodic basis. The only good idea in this paragraph is the incidental one of a regional rather than a purely national approach, but that point of view is one for which we have already striven.

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Moreover, the fact that essential intelligence is immediately and adequately revealed in the present Weekly has already been mentioned. (See 10, preceding.)

14. Paragraph 13 of the subject memorandum presents an important function of ORE, which has always been understood.

15. Paragraph 14 appears to be a reiteration of the idea in paragraphs 7-9 with particular application to estimates. The ORE series normally provides a brief summary which will serve to indicate the "must" reading to anyone sufficiently attracted by the title to be interested at all; the remainder may be skipped or read in accordance with the degree of satisfaction provided by the summary, or interest aroused thereby. But, as shown in paragraph 9 above, no device will obviate entirely the usefulness of an aide. Every effort is made to attain brevity and conciseness, but treatment must be adequate.

16. The contents of paragraphs 15 to 17 are concerned with a subject which does not seem germane to the remainder of the memorandum under reference. ORE expects to undertake the National Intelligence Digests project in such form as it may ultimately be presented. Preliminary studies have been underway for several weeks past.

17. Paragraph 18 implies that C.I.G. has not as yet produced any intelligence. ORE has in fact produced a considerable body of intelligence which has been well received, according to the OCD survey. This point is demonstrated in ORE progress report to 31 December. This production is impressive in terms of the resources available.

If it be true that other agencies have advanced "queries..... as to when C.I.G. is going to produce intelligence", two possibilities come to mind. It is just possible (1) that the persons who have made the inquiries have not had available to them the material produced, or, if available, have not given it due attention, or (2) that they have a conception of intelligence which differs from the C.I.G. conception, and are in reality thinking about "information" or releases of miscellany so commonly resorted to by practically all of the Federal Departments.

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